this account, to have been. The ideal nature of the French phenomenon was not marred by Germany's inability to emulate it. On the contrary, not the model, but the circumstances across the Rhine were pronounced an aberration. For the welfare state, the path from event to interpretation, from the classic historical example to its deviations, was reversed. At almost the same time as Bismarck tainted the bourgeois revolution in Germany by imposing it from above on the class that ought, in the traditional social interpretation, to have been its initiator, he associated the inauguration of the welfare state with the preservation of an archaic social order, the smooth functioning of the capitalist system, the political domination of conservatives. 4 The social interpretation of the welfare state has been made possible only to the extent that social policy was freed from its tie to Bismarck and Bonaparte and associated positively with the downtrodden, particularly the workers, and their strivings for greater equality and a fairer distribution of burdens. Based on a selective reading of certain historical experiences, it was first made plausible by the world-wide push for a universalist, egalitarian social policy that culminated during the final years of World War II, spilling over into major attempts at change, of which the Beveridge Plan and Clement Attlee's legislation were the crowning achievements. The postwar wave of reform undermined the Bonapartist view of social policy that Bismarck's legislation had encouraged. Social policy could be used for reactionary purposes, but, given the right circumstances, social legislation could also be the autonomous, authentically emancipatory action of the underprivileged. While Labour's reforms inaugurated a new conception of social policy, they were unable to sustain it alone. Illuminating the sky like a flare, brilliantly but briefly, wartime efforts permitted the discovery of a non-Bismarckian strain of social policy that both preceded and was to outlive it. Developments in the Scandinavian countries had generally passed unremarked until Beveridge.5 With the attention devoted to reform during and after the war, it no longer escaped notice that, in the North, long traditions of socialist power coincided with social policy of an universalist, egalitarian sort. Neither social policy nor Scandinavia has ever been the same. With the failure of postwar reforms in France and Germany, and Britain's decline from welfare ideality, the Scandinavian countries came into their own as examples of nations where enlightened, egalitarian social policy seemed to have been the independent achievement of the neediest classes. Where Scandinavia had earlier attracted the attention mainly of those interested in, say, pig farming or temperance movements, the North suddenly found itself the center of international atten-citizenship, limits the free working of market relations in important areas, and lessens inequalities. 8 The social interpretation asserts that the Scandinavian welfare states were the autonomous achievement of the underprivileged classes, that their nature was determined by the needs of the impoverished. In other countries, where social policy reflected a fear of social upheaval, measures were restricted, divisive, and manipulative. The features that define the exceptionalism of Nordic welfare policy were, in contrast, the result of the Left's ability to forge a coalition of the downtrodden powerful enough to implement the demand of the poor and unfortunate for help from the affluent and favored.9 This viewthat there was an essential link between the apparent solidarity, the universalism of early Scandinavian welfare policy, and the socialists-is misleading.10 It anachronistically reads back a misunderstanding of postwar reforms to an earlier period in which other factors were at work. " The characteristic features of Scandinavian social insurance were not bom in the postwar period, when socialist power reached its height, but were formed at the time the first legislation went on the books, at the turn of the century. They were determined at the behest of parties and social groups not associated with the Left. Universalist, solidaristic social policy was, in this case, not the sort of qualitative change claimed by social interpretation. Only apparently did it transcend narrow class or group interests. Only in retrospect has it come to seem the demand of the rising working class and the Left. When first introduced in Scandinavia, universalist, egalitarian, tax-financed welfare measures were a goal some bourgeois groups and parties were able to inflict in their own interests on the rest of society.
The rest of this account argues the case for these assertions by examining the origins of Scandinavian social policy's unique features. It analyzes the reasons why measures here were universalist, covering all regardless of social class, and why they were financed significantly through taxes, not premiums. It takes pension policy as the most convenient gateway to these issues. It concludes that universalism and tax financing were not the expression in terms of welfare policy of any uniquely Nordic sense of social solidarity and certainly not one inspired by socialists or workers. Instead, these features were the result of narrow interest disputes fought out between the rising rural middle class and the entrenched bureaucratic and urban elites. It follows that the social interpretation of the welfare state rests on shaky foundations even in its Scandinavian redoubt.
FARMERS, CONSERVATIVES, AND THE ORIGINS OF UNIVERSALIST SOCIAL POLICY: DENMARK
The first Danish social-insurance reforms were articulated in the context of the major political dispute of the late nineteenth century. This crisis was sparked by the unwillingness of the conservative H0jre (the party of the monarchical bureaucracy, the urban professional and manufacturing classes and the aristocratic landowners) to grant the mainly agrarian liberal Venstre Party the political representation to which farmers' growing social and economic importance gave them a claim. Farmers sought reforms that would benefit them financially. When the constitutional conflict dragged on, social policy became part of the larger political struggle between liberals and conservatives, and eventually was an element in its resolution. Social reform was taken up as an alternative way of achieving the effects of the fiscal demands still blocked by the conservatives. Farmers used social policy tailored to their specifications to squeeze concessions from a state they did not yet control, before more direct solutions were possible. Without coverage of all, agrarians would not benefit from social measures. Without tax financing and state subsidies, farmers, as employers, would be disadvantaged by higher production costs that they, as exporters, could accept less sanguinely than the urban manufacturers among their political opponents, who aimed only at the home market. The political victory for the liberals that permitted farmers to reform the tax system and shift burdens from the countryside to the cities had to wait until the turn of the century. Universalist, tax-financed social policy was its herald. stood to bear the brunt of costs distributed in this way. Because most farms were small or medium-sized enterprises practicing labor-intensive agriculture, they could not bear premiums with the same facility as the large protectionist industries of Germany.37 Second, the use of tax financing avoided the higher wages needed to enable workers to pay premiums.38 Unlike the protectionist Germans and Swedes, Danish farmers sold at prices determined on the world market and could absorb higher production costs only at the risk of decreased competitiveness. State financing held out special economic advantages to farmers to the extent they could side-step the higher taxes that would follow. Related to these considerations was a third factor born of the severity of the late nineteenth-century agricultural crisis. Funded contributory social insurance could have begun only after a lengthy transition period during which the currently needy would still be without aid. Tax 
liberals' penchant for administrative minimalism and their disinclination to swell the ranks of civil servants, who usually voted for conservatives.42
Taxes were only one of the reasons why farmers favored reform that promised to ease their burdens. Despite a successful shift in products, they faced worsening problems as the agricultural crisis deepened.43 Agrarians were affected simultaneously by two problems. The transition to animal production was profitable because livestock and dairy prices remained stable, while feed costs declined. In the 1890s, transportation efficiencies intensified competition with the New World and pressed livestock prices. As profits were squeezed, labor problems arose. Animal and dairy farming were more labor intensive than grain, while, perversely, the new productive techniques allowed smallholders to withdraw from wage earning to cultivate their own land. Large farmers needed more labor at the same time that competition and falling prices limited their ability to improve conditions and to stem migration. How to make rural life more attractive was an important concern. Pensions were but one of the most successful measures considered that demonstrated the close connection between the agricultural crisis and social reform. Because agrarians sought to improve the lot of their laborers, and because their work force included both wage earners and smallholders, dependent only partially on outside employment, limiting social measures to wage earners, not to mention the urban working class, was out of the question.44 cence and their disinclination to pay for measures from whose enjoyment they were barred. The decision against contributory social insurance on the German model was the result of similar forces. Extending pensions to all citizens undermined financing by premiums. The self-employed, especially farmers, saw no reason to pay for their benefits alone, while workers were helped out by their employers. Tax financing proved necessary in a country where most citizens were still independents. While contributions were tolerable for large businesses, they were, for the mass of small agricultural employers, an unacceptable burden that could be transferred to the state and the tax-paying community at large. The universalist and largely tax-financed pension system, in these ways, reflected the demands of small farmers.
Attempts to solve the pension problem in Sweden at the end of the nineteenth century failed, with success reserved for a law in 1913 based on novel principles. This legislation introduced, for the first time, "folk pensions" that gave all citizens at least token benefits, regardless of class or income. Reform came late because farmers opposed the bureaucracy's inclination to follow Bismarck's example but, for the time being, they could only obstruct government plans, not yet implement their own. At the same time, while farmers were still unable to dictate change, their desires were less clearly opposed to the conservative program than in Denmark. Previous satisfaction of agricultural demands on tax and military issues, that to the south were resolved only with or after disputes over social policy, moderated antagonisms between farmers and landed aristocrats on the one hand, and industrialists, manufacturers, urban professional classes, and the civil service on the other.
Among the issues of concern to farmers, two were closely connected: military reorganization and tax reform. Military burdens were distributed unevenly, resting with particular weight in the countryside. Taxes, too, were archaically and unfairly apportioned. The conservatives' ambitions to modernize the armed forces and the farmers' contradicting hopes of a frugal administration and their determination not to concede military reform without tax reform were reconciled by degrees over two decades. Taxes that especially burdened agricultural land were gradually reapportioned, and the army was reformed.45 Unlike in Denmark, where social reform coincided with the political deadlock between urban and rural groups, major agrarian demands had been satisfied in Sweden by the time social reform was first put on the agenda. Tariffs were another issue over which the Swedish agrarians and conservatives fought less bitterly than across the Kattegat. Rather than 45 59 An important cause of the Swedes' concern with costs related to their demographic peculiarities. Blessed by unusual longevity and cursed by high emigration, the population's age profile was markedly skewed toward the older end. In 1900, Sweden had almost twice as many inhabitants over age seventy as Britain and Germany, and 15 and 20 percent more than even France and contributions would have to be collected. Employer contributions played no role in a system not limited to wage earners, but state subsidies allowed higher benefits than otherwise possible. To keep residents of expensive urban areas off poor relief, means-tested local supplements to the otherwise inadequate pensions were permitted. The goverment's bill followed the commission.60 Had measures been passed some decades earlier, it admitted, they would probably have been limited to wage earners. Favorable economic developments now allowed all to be included. Employer premiums had been replaced by state financing for fear that wage earners would be privileged while small employers were called on to pay both for themselves and their workers.
The socialists' approach to this reform was interesting. Unlike their Danish colleagues in the late nineteenth century, Swedish socialists focussed attention on the urban industrial working class, undistracted by the desire to appeal to agrarians. The social and economic complexions of the two countries partially explain this result. Sweden's mining and timber gave the economy an industrialized hue. 61 Denmark was still more urbanized than Sweden, but agriculture played a dominant role. Danish agriculture was characterized by comparatively large farms worked by laborers, who were riper for socialist recruitment than Sweden's generally small independent farmers. Socialist ideology in Sweden reflected these differences. When formulating its first party program, the Swedish Left ignored the agrarian question, assuming, and therefore assuring, the futility of winning support among rural workers.62 A Kautskian approach to agriculture squared off against a Danish-style attempt at a "folk party" in internal debate.63 Only after the turn of the century did the orthodox approach make way for a more reformist angle. In part, the Swedes replicated an adjustment of Marxist doctrine to political reality found across European socialist parties. In equal measure, they took account of domestic social peculiarities, the political costs of ignoring rural classes with too blindered a favoritism for workers. The advantages of appealing to agrarians became especially obvious after the electoral reforms of 1907-09 extended the franchise. In 1911, the year of the first elections with universal manhood suffrage, a major revision of the party's platform shifted its focus from the working class, narrowly defined, to all oppressed, whatever their social origin. 64 Despite such shifts, socialist support for the 1913 pension bill, coinciding with a sharpening internal conflict between doctrinaires and reformists, was far from unanimous.65 Early in the year, the party's parliamentary deputies had decided for an universalist approach. Later discussion revealed the presence of a minority in favor of treating various social groups differently. Several supported a contributory system.66 Although the parliamentary group accepted the government bill, conflicts arose within the broader movement. The party executive was displeased that the deputies had abandoned employer contributions, and were seconded in their doubts by the unions.67 Some, like Gustav Steffen, the well-known sociologist in the senate, preferred pensions on the German model that treated workers and independents separately. Imposing on all citizens a social-insurance system developed for wage earners was unfortunate, he admitted, but no worse than the government's converse choice of extending to all a system formulated in the interests of the selfemployed. The productive process ought to meet the cost of old age and disability through employer premiums.68
On the other side, Hjalmar Branting, leader of the socialists, accepted the bill. His defense of it in parliament was a masterful summation of the pension issue and its social background. Had the Swedish working class been more powerful when legislation was first proposed, he conceded, the problem might have been resolved as in Germany. But even with measures limited to workers, changes would have followed. Contributory workers' insurance could not have been extended beyond the ranks of large industrial employers. In Sweden, small employers were powerful and able to resist contributory financing more resolutely than their counterparts across the Baltic.
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The socialists had shifted their stance, he admitted. They had supported insurance limited to workers, but now favored universalist measures. This broad acceptance of all-inclusive arrangements was due to the advance of the popular classes in the countryside, whose interests had been given representation through electoral reform. Sweden was not an industrialized society like Germany or Britain, and small independents relied on poor relief as much as wage earners. Thus social insurance that focussed only on workers ignored Sweden's social structure. Conceding that universalist social policy was unavoidable, Branting went on to the difficulties of securing fair treatment for workers within a system that covered all: That harmonizing the interests of the poorest rural inhabitants, with those of urban workers, was troublesome. State subsidies should be given in proportion to the premium paid, more to urban than rural groups. Eliminating urban municipal supplements that would have given workers larger pensions than farmers had been a step backwards. It was difficult with universalist national insurance to maintain sufficient differentiation between well-and poorly-paid groups. Improvements for the worst-off should not be brought at the expense of the industrial working class.69
In both Denmark and Sweden, social-policy reform was born during a period of major political change and struggle as the child of native social and economic circumstances. The late nineteenth century saw the breakthrough of democratic politics and the coming to power of the broad middle classes, in Scandinavian circumstances primarily farmers and peasants. In this clash, agrarians wrested from the traditional political elites of urban professionals, royal bureaucrats, and aristocratic estate owners that influence to which their growing social and economic importance entitled them. Social-policy reform was colored by its coincidence with this battle. Reforms reflected the strengthened power of farmers and their determination not to be deprived of new forms of statutory benevolence. Socialists were not without a presence during these changes. Vaguely Bonapartist fears encouraged the bourgeois parties to implement some form of statutory social measures. Nevertheless, the content and nature of those finally chosen were determined by the needs of the agrarians, who were emerging as dominant among the bourgeois groups. The occasional and grudging approval by the socialists of those features of social reform for which they would later take and be given credit were responses to demands advanced by agrarians and liberals.
In 1891 In Sweden, matters took a somewhat different course. Well-developed, efficient, and insulated by the rudimentary nature of Swedish politics from outside pressures, the government bureaucracy was initially able to formulate plans for social reform that followed lessons learned from Bismarck more closely than native social circumstances and the wishes of not yet powerful groups. Reformers at first set their sights on contributory social insurance restricted to the working class. But, while capable of formulating reforms in isolation, they could not pass and implement measures that ignored the wishes of important interests.70 Because antagonisms between liberals and conservatives, and rural and urban groups, were less pronounced than in Denmark, the main dispute in Sweden arose between farmers and the powerful government bureaucracy that was eventually forced to consider their desires. Attempts at reform were stymied for over two decades until, in 1913, Sweden finally implemented universalist, largely tax-financed, pensions. This ar-rangement rejected Bismarck's legacy, anticipated Beveridge, and embodied the major features later regarded as the essence of the Nordic welfare state. Far from being the realization of demands put forth by the oppressed or the Left, they reflected farmers' wishes not to be deprived of state-subsidized measures that were otherwise targeted at workers only.
In the social interpretation of the welfare state, Bismarck's reforms exemplified social policy used for reactionary, Bonapartist purposes. They were limited to workers, who posed the most immediate threat to social stability. Benefits were differentiated by income to preserve the hierarchies of the marketplace even outside its sphere. Financing was assured through employer and worker premiums with little state financing in order to hold redistribution to a minimum. The Scandinavian welfare states, on the contrary, were qualitatively different in realizing the need of the disadvantaged for solidarity. Nordic social policy supposedly demonstrated that real reform could be wrung from the privileged by the oppressed themselves, on their own terms. It embodied equality, not hierarchy; consensus, not conflict; solidarity, not separatism. Scandinavian measures were universal in their embrace of all citizens. They were financed through taxes that fairly apportioned burdens and had a penchant for being formally egalitarian flat-rate benefits.
The social interpretation anachronistically attributes these features to the power of the social democrats and the working class. Decisions in favor of universalist, tax-financed, egalitarian measures were taken before the socialists had much say in the matter and often against their will. The cornerstone of the unique Nordic welfare edifice was set already during the late nineteenth century, not in the 1930s or after World War II, when the social democrats gained power. Social insurance had been formulated first in Germany to deal with well-paid urban workers. In Scandinavia, these classes could not be the focus. North of the Eider, priorities were defined by the emerging agrarian middle classes. Scandinavian pensions were made universalist because farmers refused to be excluded from these new forms of statutory generosity. They were tax-financed because, in this way, the rural classes expected to gain more than they lost. State-financed social policy is no better than the tax system on which it rests. To attribute the (often dubious) progressivity of twentieth-century measures to an earlier period is to misunderstand the nature of battles then fought out between social groups, in the guise of fiscal and welfare reform. In Scandinavia of the late nineteenth century, government-financed social policy was an element of a drawn-out dispute between rural and urban elites whose resolution allowed farmers to shift social burdens to their urban opponents.
Both of these characteristics-universality and tax financing-did, in fact, later become progressive, solidaristic aspects of welfare policy in the North. When the decision was first made to follow this Sonderweg in Scandinavian social policy, however, these features were the result of demands put forth by the emerging agrarian middle classes on their own behalf. Such characteristics were not created, only continued, by the socialists in the 1930s and later. This is not necessarily to denigrate these aspects of Scandinavian social policy. It is, however, to take a realistic look at their genealogies and to make an accurate appraisal of their origins, one that can explain why the Nordic welfare states were unusual without resorting either to the vagueness of supposedly unique Scandinavian social virtues or to the anachronism of socialism's heroic march in these most quintessentially petty bourgeois of European nations. The origins of virtue turn out to be mundane: The solidarity of one age has its roots in the selfishness of another.
